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Abstract 
Balanced budget requirements lead to substantial pro-cyclicality in state government 
spending on infrastructure and public services.  Differences in the stringency of states’ 
budget rules drive the pace at which they must make these adjustments.  We show that 
budget rules (and other fiscal institutions) generate variation in deficit-financed 
expenditures, which could be ideal for studying fiscal stabilization policy.  In contrast, 
many alternative sources of variation in sub-national fiscal policy implicitly involve 
“windfall” financing, which will miss the effects of future debt on current consumption 
and investment behavior.  Difficulties with our proposed identification strategy prevent 
us from cleanly estimating a multiplier.      
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1. Introduction 
State governments, whose spending accounts for around 10% of GDP, play a 
major role in the fiscal policy landscape.  Since almost all US states have formal balanced 
budget requirements, a large share of their spending fluctuates pro-cyclically.  When 
states enter recessions, their tax bases contract and their safety-net expenditures expand.  
Compliance with balanced budget requirements can thus entail significant reductions in 
capital expenditures and in spending on publicly provided goods and services.
2
   
It is difficult to rationalize pro-cyclical spending on infrastructure and service 
provision as serving any welfare-enhancing purpose.  The consumption of public 
services, for example, would generate greater utility if these services flowed smoothly.  
Similarly, if capital expenditures must be conducted with any cyclical orientation at all, 
they would ideally be reserved for downturns as a source of “shovel ready” projects.  The 
increase in business-cycle volatility that is induced by pro-cyclical state spending would 
thus appear to come without offsetting benefits.   
The contribution of state governments to the business cycle depends on two 
parameters.  The first parameter is a measure of how pro-cyclical their spending is in 
practice.  Using state-level data on income and the relevant categories of government 
spending, we estimate this parameter in Section 2.  For each $1 that income deviates from 
trend, state spending on infrastructure and service provision deviates from trend by 9 
cents.   
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 In this context, safety-net programs primarily include Unemployment Insurance (UI), cash welfare 
assistance, and Medicaid.  Spending out of insurance trusts, which includes state UI programs, is not 
subject to state balanced budget requirements.  Other insurance trust spending is dominated by pension 
plans for public employees.  Non safety-net spending primarily involves spending on education, 
transportation, health, law enforcement (including corrections), and relatively minor categories including 
spending on utilities and public parks. 
 3 
The second parameter of interest is the fiscal policy multiplier associated with 
state spending on capital infrastructure and public services.  Estimating the causal effect 
of government spending on the economy requires isolating variation that is not, itself, 
driven by the business cycle.  The fact that shifts in economic activity can be direct 
determinants of government spending makes isolating such variation difficult.   
The empirical macroeconomic literature on fiscal policy has attempted to isolate 
exogenous shocks to government spending using a combination of Structural Vector 
Autoregressions (SVARs) and narrative histories.
3
  The primary source of variation in 
this literature can make both inference and extrapolation difficult (see, e.g., the discussion 
in Auerbach and Gale, 2009).  An examination of the time series for aggregate 
government spending reveals that the shocks isolated by both SVAR and narrative 
methods will stem largely from defense spending, with the unexpected component 
coming primarily from the World War II and Korean War build-ups (Ramey, 
forthcoming).  Such spending makes inference difficult for two reasons.  First, wars can 
be associated with other important shifts in economic policy.
4
  Second, the onset and 
resolution of wars may have significant impacts on expectations for future tax and 
income streams, both of which are determinants of current consumption, investment, and 
labor supply decisions.   
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 An early paper in this relatively recent literature is Blanchard and Perotti (2002).   More recent examples 
include Ramey (forthcoming), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), and Mountford and Uhlig (2008). 
 
4
 During World War II, for example, the US economy underwent the imposition of rationing and price 
controls. 
 4 
Difficulties with extrapolation from the macroeconomic studies also relate to their 
reliance on defense spending.  There are important differences between defense spending 
and the kinds of spending typically considered for stimulus purposes.  Unlike defense 
spending, spending on infrastructure, health, and education affects the economy’s 
production possibilities and may enter into individuals’ utility functions.  Also unlike 
defense spending, spending on programs like Medicaid and Unemployment Insurance 
involve incentive effects that influence labor supply.   
A recent (and very much “in progress”) literature estimates the effects of fiscal 
policy using plausibly exogenous variation in government spending at the sub-national 
level.
5
  We show in Section 3 that this variation tends to depart in an important way from 
the ideal natural experiment for evaluating stabilization policy.  Specifically, the 
spending is effectively “windfall” financed rather than deficit financed.  This is common 
to sources of variation that involve federal financing.  With federal financing, the tax 
burden is borne by both the “treatment” states that receive the spending and the “control” 
states that do not.  Any tendency for deficit financing to crowd out private consumption 
and investment will thus cancel out within the estimation strategy.  In a standard new-
Keynesian framework, windfall-financed spending will tend to produce larger multiplier 
estimates than deficit-financed spending (see, e.g., the discussion by Cogan, Cwik, 
Taylor and Wieland, 2009). 
We argue that differences in states’ fiscal institutions, which affect their short-run 
savings behavior, have the potential to yield an ideal source of variation for studying 
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 See, e.g., Council of Economic Advisers (2009), Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2010), Serrato and 
Wingender (2010),  Shoag (2010), and Nakamura and Steinson (2011). 
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fiscal policy.  Spending variation generated by fiscal institutions (broadly taken to 
include balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limitations, and rainy day 
funds) affects states’ long run budget constraints.  Unlike windfall-financed spending, a 
spending increase induced by fiscal institutions is deficit financed.  Furthermore, the 
variation will occur in precisely the categories of spending associated with stimulus-
oriented policy decisions. 
In sections 4 through 6 we explore an instance in which fiscal institutions produce 
an intuitively appealing source of variation in state fiscal policy.  In doing so, we extend 
result from Poterba (1994) on the effect of states’ balanced budget requirements on their 
responses to fiscal shocks.  The relevant result uses the fact that states have varying 
degrees of stringency built into the rules which govern deficit financing of general fund 
expenditures.  During times of fiscal stress, we see that states with strict rules enact 
relatively large rescissions to their budgets in order to quickly narrow emerging deficits.  
As part of this extension we make an updated version of the deficit shock series 
(including its component parts as reported by the National Association of State Budget 
Officers) available electronically through an online data appendix.    
We explore the prospects for using the spending cuts made by strict-rule states (in 
excess of those made by weak-rule states) to identify the effects of these budget cuts on 
state economic outcomes.  Two difficulties prevent us from taking a concrete stand on the 
size of the multiplier based on the evidence we present.  First, states with weak balanced 
budget rules rely more extensively than others on personal income taxation as a source of 
revenue.  Since personal income taxation is a relatively volatile source of revenue, states 
with weak budget rules will experience relatively large fiscal shocks in the face of an 
 6 
economic shock of a given size.  For reasons elaborated below, this violates the key 
identifying assumption associated with the proposed estimation framework.  In principal, 
there are ways to adjust for this source of bias.  However, efforts to make these 
adjustments reveal a troubling degree of sensitivity across specifications and sample 
periods.  A general lack of precision (our second difficulty), coupled with sensitivity 
across specifications, makes it unwise to treat any particular result as a best estimate, or 
best reading, of the evidence.   
2. Budget Rules and State Spending Over the Business Cycle 
Balanced budget requirements dictate a tight relationship between state 
governments’ tax collections and expenditures.6  Absent significant saving through 
stabilization funds during expansions, states must choose between increasing tax rates 
and reducing expenditures during recessions.  We save a discussion of differences in the 
stringency of states’ balanced budget rules for section 5.  At present, we note only that 
even the weakest rules require states to enter each fiscal year with the expectation that the 
year’s general fund expenditures will not exceed revenues.7  In this section we focus on 
the fact that, as a consequence of these requirements (coupled with generally limited 
saving in stabilization funds), states exhibit significant pro-cyclicality in their spending 
on capital infrastructure and service provision (or non safety net expenditures).   
We illustrate the pro-cyclicality of non safety net expenditures in Figures 1 and 2, 
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 To avoid unneeded confusion, we note here that we use the terms “spending,” “outlays,” and 
“expenditures” interchangeably. 
7
 As we show later, differences in state’s budget rules dictate differences in how they respond to 
unexpected shocks. 
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which we constructed using flexibly de-trended data on personal income and the relevant 
categories of government spending.
8
  The variables, as with all others in this study, are 
presented and analyzed in real, per capita terms.  Figure 1 plots the means of these de-
trended series (taken across states) over time from 1960-2006.  Figure 2 displays each 
state-by-year observation for the two series in scatter plot form.  The timing of the 
cyclical adjustments in state spending (as illustrated in Figure 1) is consistent with what 
one would expect due to balanced budget requirements.  Spending tracks the business 
cycle with a lag of about one.  The best-fit line in Figure 2 implies that when personal 
income is $1 below trend, spending outside of safety net programs tends to be 8.9 cents 
below trend (with a standard error of 1.4 cents). 
The full effect of this pro-cyclical spending on the business cycle depends on the 
fiscal policy multiplier associated with these expenditures.  Most directly, it depends on 
the multiplier that would be associated smoothing, or shifting the timing, of these 
expenditures.  The implications for aggregate volatility could be substantial.  If the 
relevant multiplier is as large as two (as estimated by Shoag, 2010), state governments 
would be responsible for nearly 20% of all business-cycle volatility.  On the other hand, 
if shifts government expenditures displace contemporaneous private activity (as found by 
Cohen, Coval, and Malloy, 2010), state governments may cause a relatively small portion 
of volatility.      
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 Specifically, we regressed both non safety net spending and personal income on state-specific quartic 
trends.  Non safety net spending is defined as the sum of “capital” and “current” expenditures minus 
expenditures on “public welfare,” which is dominated by Medicaid and cash welfare assistance.  Altering 
the number of terms in the polynomial does not significantly change the results, although a relatively 
flexible polynomial seems clearly preferable to a simple linear trend given the variety of changes a state’s 
economic trajectory can make over the course of five decades.  We obtain similar results when running 
each state’s income and spending data through the Hodrick-Prescott filter rather than de-trending with 
polynomials. 
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3. Differentiating between Sources of Variation in Fiscal Policy 
 In this section we lay out a framework for analyzing proposed sources of variation 
for estimating fiscal policy multipliers on sub-national government spending.  A benefit 
of standard applied microeconomic approaches (in particular relative to VAR and SVAR 
methods) is that they make it possible to be very explicit about the source of the variation 
used for econometric identification.
9
  We describe how alternative sources of variation 
can be mapped into distinct natural experiments in fiscal policy.
10
  We focus, in 
particular, on differences in the implied financing of the relevant government spending.   
 Our characterization of sources of variation in sub-national fiscal policy involves 
tracking their impact on state spending, Gs,t, tax revenues, Ts,t, and the net present value 
of future liabilities, NPVLs,t, at some time t.
11
  A source of variation in fiscal policy can 
be thought of as an instrumental variable, Zs,t, which is assumed to be exogenous with 
respect to some state-level economic outcome, Ys,t, like income or employment.  This 
exogeneity may require conditioning on a vector of covariates, Xs,t, which could include 
fixed effects, time trends and other relevant controls.    To characterize the natural 
experiment associated with Zs,t one can run the following series of regressions involving 
the fiscal variables: 
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 The explicit use of narrative shocks or some other clearly defined source of variation within a VAR or 
SVAR framework, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) and  Giavazzi and Favero (2009), can also 
be an attractive source of relatively transparent identification. 
10
 Natural experiments in fiscal policy can differ along several dimensions that are relevant for thinking 
about their associated multipliers.  These include their impact on the economy’s production possibilities, 
the extent to which they substitute for (or complement) private consumption, their timing, and their impact 
on incentives (e.g., for labor supply) in addition to how they are financed.   
11
 In many applications NPVL could be proxied for by a measure of a states’ current year deficit.  When the 
financing of state (or local) expenditures takes place at the national level, a measure of each state’s share of 
federal tax liabilities may be required.  
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Many sources of variation in state government spending involve changes in the 
distribution of an existing pool of federal funds.  Examples include reallocations induced 
by changes in the structure of congressional power (see, e.g., Cohen, Coval, and Malloy, 
2010) and reallocations brought about by updates to formulas that dictate the distribution 
of intergovernmental grants (see, e.g., Serrato and Wingender, 2010).  In a very direct 
sense, these sources of variation amount to transfers from one state to another.
12
  The 
recipients of these transfers incur no deficits as a result of the ensuing government 
expenditures.  If the money is spent as intended, Zs,t could be scaled so that β1 = 1 while 
β2 = β3 = 0.  One would want to confirm, however, that the state does not offset the 
intended expenditures by decreasing other expenditures and lowering current or future 
taxes, in which case the natural experiment would involve 0 < β1 < 1, β2 < 0, and β3 = β1 - 
β2 - 1.  It would be crucial in the latter case to realize that the increase in government 
spending would not fully characterize the natural experiment.
13
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 As noted by Shoag (2010), the shocks to returns in states’ pension funds which serve as his source of 
econometric identification are also equivalent to cross-state transfers. 
13
 Implementation of such an approach can easily go awry when researchers focus exclusively on whether 
or not they have a “strong instrument” for predicting government expenditures.  For example, suppose β1 = 
0.75 while β2 = 0.25, both estimated with standard errors of 0.15.  In this instance, the instrument could be 
characterized as being a strong predictor of spending while not having a statistically significant relationship 
with tax collections.  Yet tax collections make up a non-trivial 25% of the total natural experiment in fiscal 
policy.  Standard use of Zs,t as an instrument for government spending would lead to an inflated estimate of 
the government spending multiplier in standard Keynesian frameworks.  With only one instrument, the 
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Other sources of variation in state government spending involve the distribution 
of a deficit- (surplus-) financed increase (decrease) in spending at the national level.  A 
recent example involves formula-induced variation in the funds disbursed through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Council of Economic Advisers, 2009).  
Another involves the differential impact of changes in defense spending on states with 
different exposure to defense-related industries (Nakamura and Steinson, 2011).  If the 
residents of each state or locality pay an equal share of the federal tax burden, then these 
natural experiments become equivalent to changes in the distribution of an existing pool 
of funds.  Suppose, for example, that a policy change results in an extra dollar of 
spending in half of the states and no change in the others, with all states facing an 
increase in their future tax liability with a present value of 50 cents.  In comparing the 
impact of this policy change across regions, the future tax liabilities will difference out. 
This leaves the equivalent of a windfall-financed increase in spending in the states that 
received the federal funds.  Econometrically, an instrument that perfectly predicts the $1 
spending differential would be uncorrelated with a perfect measure of future tax 
liabilities.  As before, Zs,t could be scaled so that β1 = 1 while β2 = β3 = 0.
14
  
Changes in government spending that are driven by states’ fiscal institutions will 
differ from the spending changes just described.  Such changes will not involve external 
                                                                                                                                                                     
multiplier on government spending cannot be independently identified.  With a single instrument one can 
only estimate the effect of the entire natural experiment in fiscal policy.  When spending and tax changes 
are both in play, the reduced form relationship between Zs,t and Ys,t will provide the only directly 
interpretable presentation of the results. 
14
 Note here that if states differ in the extent to which they are expected to bear the burden of future tax 
liabilities there may be a separate instrument that could be used to identify the effects of deficit financing.  
The availability of such a variable would make it possible, in principal, to recover estimates of the effects 
of fiscal policy associated with any degree of deficit finance. 
 11 
sources of finance, so that any increase in spending (net of taxes) necessarily involves an 
increase in future liabilities.  These institutions will not, in general, generate exogenous 
variation in the average level of government spending.  They do, however, generate 
plausibly exogenous variation in how states respond to shocks.  Budget rules, for 
example (as detailed below), dictate the pace at which states adjust in response to 
unexpected deficits.  Similarly, savings devices like rainy day funds may generate 
differences in how states respond to the arrival of intergovernmental transfers.
15
  In cases 
where fiscal institutions affect spending behavior without affecting revenue-raising 
behavior, Zs,t could be scaled so that β1 = β3 =1 while β2 = 0.  This is precisely the natural 
experiment at the heart of stabilization policy.  Distinguishing between this setting and 
settings where β3 = 0 is crucial for testing the importance of traditional Keynesian 
mechanisms relative to the considerations associated with Ricardian equivalence, which 
incorporates rational expectations of future tax liabilities (Barro, 1974).
16
  Any crowd out 
of private consumption or investment that results from deficit financing is implicitly 
netted out when the financing burden is spread equally across the treatment and control 
groups. 
4. A Measure of Fiscal Shocks and its Relation to the Business Cycle 
We now work through our attempt to estimate a fiscal policy multiplier using 
variation induced by fiscal institutions.  We begin in this section by describing the 
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 Suppose, for example, that a federal stimulus policy involved $10 billion transfers to each state and that 
states with rainy day funds save a greater share of these transfers than others.  The difference in spending 
between the two sets of states would effectively be deficit financed; it would be associated with an 
equivalently-sized change in their future liabilities. 
16
 Considerations driven by rational expectations are incorporated into both real business cycle and new-
Keynesian models as discussed by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009). 
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construction of a measure of fiscal shocks and providing evidence on how these shocks 
relate to business cycles.  In Section 5 we provide evidence on how differences in states’ 
balanced budget requirements dictate the speed with which they respond to the shocks.  
Since we do not, in the end, conclude that the evidence justifies a strong stance regarding 
the size of the multiplier, we hold off on extensively detailing a variety of caveats that 
arise in the construction of the deficit shocks and the coding of the budget rules.  Readers 
interested in further exploring such details or in using the deficit shock data should 
consult the online data appendix. 
Following Poterba (1994), we quantify fiscal shocks using the difference between 
budget forecasts and realizations, which are expressed without mid-year adjustments as 
described below:
 
 
Expenditure Shockt = OutlayCL,t – Et-1(Outlayst) 
Revenue Shockt = RevenueCL,t – Et-1(Revenuest). 
The terms involving expectations are outlay and revenue forecasts, where the forecast is 
made at the end of the previous fiscal year.  OutlayCL,t and RevenueCL,t are the constant-
law levels of outlays and revenues; they are what would prevail in the absence of mid-
year adjustments to the budget.  The difference between these terms provides a true 
measure of expenditure and revenue shocks.
17
  We cannot directly observe constant-law 
outlays and revenues.  However, we can recover them by subtracting mid-year changes 
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 The use of constant-law measures is crucial because mid-year adjustments to outlays and revenues will 
tend to undo the appearance of fiscal shocks.  Were mid-year adjustments to be complete, for example, 
realized deficits would always equal zero assuming all states enter the fiscal year expecting the budget to 
balance.    
 13 
(denoted as ∆Outlayst  and ∆Revenuet) from the final outlay and revenue realizations for 
the fiscal year (Outlayst  and Revenuet).  We compute the total shock by combining the 
revenue and expenditure shocks to form: 
Deficit Shockt = Expenditure Shockt – Revenue Shockt. 
Beginning in 1988, the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) reports 
all the information required to construct these shocks in its semi-annual Fiscal Survey of 
the States series. 
Three features of the deficit shock series are worth addressing immediately.  First, 
its dependence on forecasts raises issues associated with forecast manipulation.  Forecast 
manipulation may be a significant concern when fiscal stress is particularly severe (as 
during the recent financial crisis).
18
  We investigated the importance of forecast 
manipulation by replacing the forecasts reported by NASBO with simple econometric 
forecasts based of state income, revenues, and expenditures from the previous fiscal year.  
This change in the forecast series has essentially no effect on the deficit shock measure.    
Second, the deficit shocks’ relationship with forecasts makes them much less 
persistent than the economic shocks with which they are associated.  State forecasters 
appear to be taken by surprise during the year in which an economic shock occurs.  In 
forecasts for future years, however, the economic shock is taken into account. 
Third, the NASBO reports include mid-year spending cuts, but not mid-year 
spending increases.  This reflects some combination of institutional realities and 
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 Rose and Smith (forthcoming) discuss a literature on the extent to which revenue forecast manipulation 
may be a more general phenomenon. 
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measurement error.  The rules for changing appropriations in response to adverse shocks 
differ from those for changing appropriations in response to favorable shocks.  Increases 
in appropriations require legislation.  In the face of unexpected deficits, however, many 
state governors are constitutionally empowered to impose budget cuts unilaterally.  
Hence while the variable is indeed right-censored, the degree to which this reflects 
measurement error is unclear.  Measurement error only arises if legislatures appropriate 
additional spending outside of the usual appropriations cycle.  In the context of the 
NASBO data for 1988 to 1992, Reuben (1993) investigates the implications of making 
standard econometric corrections for censored data.  She finds that these corrections have 
little impact on estimates of state responses to fiscal shocks.  
Figure 3 graphs national means (across the states) of deficit shocks and de-trended 
personal income per capita from 1988 to 2004.  The figure shows that deficit shocks 
become large when an economy enters a recession.  When de-trended personal income 
turns sharply downward, large, positive deficit shocks occur.  Deficit shocks tended to be 
small and negative during the expansionary years of the mid- and late-1990s.  As 
reported in Table 1, the adverse shocks experienced at the beginnings of recessions and 
the favorable shocks experienced during expansions result in a mean shock that is fairly 
close to 0.  Because deficit shocks occur close to the peak of a state’s business-cycle, they 
are negatively correlated with changes in personal income and positively correlated with 
the level of personal income.        
5. State Responses to Deficit Shocks During Two Recessions 
 15 
In this section we analyze states’ short-term responses to deficit shocks, focusing 
on the differential effect of budget rules with different degrees of stringency.  We collect 
information on balanced budget requirements from a 1987 report by the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and from various reports by the 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO).  Rules can be differentiated in 
large part on the basis of whether they affect the enactment or execution of a state’s 
budget.  An example of a rule that applies to the budget’s enactment is a rule requiring 
the legislature to pass a balanced budget.  Such a rule does not force states to respond 
quickly to deficits that emerge over the course of the fiscal year.  It requires only that the 
budget be balanced (in expectation) in the following fiscal year, i.e., that E(Gt+1) < 
E(Tt+1).   Stricter rules apply more directly to the execution of the budget.  The strictest 
rule (also known as the “No-Carry” rule) prohibits carrying deficits through the next 
budget cycle.  This rule requires that if a deficit is incurred at time t, the budget for the 
following year must be such that Deficitt + E(Gt+1) < E(Tt+1).
19
 
  The fiscal behavior of interest takes the form of mid-year tax increases and 
spending reductions that work to narrow unexpected deficits as they emerge.  Since 
timing is central to this application, we follow Poterba (1994) in restricting our sample to 
a subset of 27 states with annual budgetary cycles and annual legislative cycles.  We save 
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 Past research has explored some of the consequences of these rules.  Notable studies include work by 
Poterba (1997) and Bohn and Inman (1996), who examine the impact of different requirements on a broad 
range of budgetary outcomes.  Highlights also include Poterba and Reuben (2001) and Lowry and Alt 
(2001), whose work addresses the nexus between balanced budget requirements, state fiscal behavior, and 
interest rates on general-obligation debt.  These studies confirm empirically that requirements which apply 
to the budget’s execution have greater impact than those that apply only to the budget’s enactment.  Strict 
budget rules are associated with lower spending levels, modestly greater accumulation of surpluses in 
budget stabilization funds, and faster adjustment in response to fiscal shocks. 
 16 
a detailed discussion of differences in the responses of states with alternative budgetary 
and legislative arrangements for the online data appendix. 
We generate our measure of budget rules using a 1 to 10 index produced by the 
ACIR (1987).  We designate the 8 states with scores less than 7 as “weak-rule” states.   
This is the cutoff associated with the relatively crucial distinction between states with and 
without a rule that approximates the No-Carry rule.  We consider a further sub-division 
of the weak-rule states into states with rules of weak- and medium-stringency.
20
  Table 2 
provides a breakdown of the states in each classification.
21
  Table 1 reports summary 
statistics (separately for states with weak and strong rules) for the fiscal variables 
analyzed in the current section as well as for additional economic and demographic 
characteristics.  The most striking demographic and economic differences between the 
groups is that weak-rule states tend to be large, highly populous, and have high incomes.  
They also, perhaps tellingly, include several of the states facing the worst budget crises 
during and after the recent recession.   
We look to states’ mid-year spending cuts and tax increases (∆Outlayst  and 
∆Revenuet), in particular to the extent that they are driven by differences in states’ 
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 In addition to the ACIR and NASBO classifications of budget rules, a classification can also be found in 
a 1993 report by GAO.  Differences between these classification systems are the subject of an exchange 
between Levinson (1998, 2007) and Krol and Svorny (2006).  An alternative classification scheme, based 
on direct readings of statutes and constitutions across states, has also been recently produced by Hou and 
Smith (2006).  The literature points towards the notion that state political culture may ultimately be as 
important as the actual content of the requirements themselves (NCSL, 2010).  We focus on the ACIR 
classification system because of its power for predicting state’s mid-year budget cuts.  This is another case 
in which we would devote more time and space to robustness analysis if we were ultimately pushing a 
particular estimate of the multiplier on state government spending.  Given that we have not settled on an 
estimate of the multiplier, however, we note only that robustness analyses along these lines, coupled with a 
compelling justification for the baseline specification, are crucial components of analyses that rely on 
particular schemes for classifying budget rules.     
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balanced budget requirements, as potential sources of variation of the sort described in 
equations (1) and (2).  This leads us to estimate equations (4) and (5), which are similar 
to specifications implemented by Poterba (1994): 
tssttststssts trendDefshockDefshockweakBBR ,,2,1, *Outlays     (4) 
.*Re ,,2,1, tssttststssts trendDefshockDefshockweakBBRvenue    (5) 
In terms of the econometric framework laid out in section 3, the interaction between the 
deficit shock and the indicator for weak budget rules, tssDefshockweakBBR , , is the 
instrument, Zs,t, while the main effect of the deficit shock is an essential element of the 
vector of control variables, Xs,t.  The reason for this will become clear in section 6 when 
we discuss the intuition behind the key identifying assumption associated with multiplier 
estimation.  In the empirical implementation, we split the deficit shocks into distinct 
variables for their positive and negative values.  Budget rules only have binding 
implications in the face of positive (i.e., adverse) deficit shocks, so that the relevant 
instrument is }0{, 1* Defshocktss DefshockweakBBR . 
Tables 3 and 4 present results describing the behavior of state governments in the 
face of unexpected fiscal shocks from 1988 through 2004.  Table 3 presents results using 
several categorizations of states on the basis of their balanced budget requirements.  
Columns 1 and 2 report results for mid-year budget cuts and mid-year tax increases, 
respectively, with all 27 states in the sample grouped together.  These results show that 
states do little in response to negative deficit shocks while enacting fairly significant 
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budget cuts and tax increases in response to positive deficit shocks.
22
  The budget cuts 
average 28 cents per dollar of deficit shock (estimated with a standard error of 6 cents) 
while the tax increases average 7.5 cents per dollar of deficit shock (estimated with a 
standard error of 2.3 cents).  The estimated tax increases are for the calendar year during 
which the shock occurs.  Since mid-year tax increases will tend, in general, to be in effect 
for fewer than 6 months out of the current fiscal year, the current-year collections can be 
much smaller than the new collections scheduled for the following fiscal year.   
Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 divide states into classification by strong and 
weak budget rules (columns 3 and 4) and by strong, medium, and weak budget rules 
(columns 5 and 6).  These columns show that the mid-year budget cuts are concentrated 
in states with relatively strict balanced budget requirements.  While strong-rule states 
enact an average of 38 cents in budget cuts per dollar of deficit shock, weak-rule states 
enact an average of 12 cents in such cuts.  The standard error on the 26 cent differential is 
6 cents, making the difference highly significant statistically.  The strong, medium, and 
weak classification yields quite similar results.
23
 
The budget rules turn out not to predict mid-year tax increases to a degree that 
could be regarded as either economically or statistically significant.  This result is crucial 
for characterizing the proposed natural experiment in fiscal policy (as discussed in 
                                                        
22
 The absence of a mid-year spending response to negative deficit shocks may be driven by the fact that 
NASBO only reports mid-year spending cuts, and not mid-year spending increases.  As discussed in 
Section 4, this may largely reflect institutional realities rather than measurement error.  Outside of the 
normal legislative cycle, it is more difficult for appropriations to be increased than for them to be rescinded. 
23
 These results are quite consistent with results from Poterba (1994).  Other results, which we do not 
report, are also broadly consistent with Poterba’s findings.  This includes the finding that states with 
relatively large balances in their stabilization funds enact less in the way of mid-year spending reductions 
per dollar of deficit shock.  
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section 3).  The result implies that the interaction between budget rules and deficit shocks 
can be viewed as isolating a shock to spending that is deficit financed, with no current 
change in tax revenues.   
Table 4 breaks the sample down into groups of years, with 1988-1994 
representing an initial period during which states experienced significant fiscal stress, 
1995-2000 representing an expansionary period during which states experienced few 
positive deficit shocks, and 2001-2004 representing a second period of fiscal stress.  State 
behavior during the two periods of fiscal stress is broadly similar.  The principal 
difference is that states enacted less in the way of mid-year tax increases during the 2001-
2004 period of stress (on the order of 6.6 cents per dollar of deficit shock versus 14.6 
cents during the earlier period). 
Differences between the expansionary period and the two periods of stress are 
striking.  Deficit shocks are generally un-predictive of state governments’ mid-year 
actions during the 1995-2000 expansion.  None of the estimates for this period are 
statistically significant and the interaction between budget rules and positive deficit 
shocks yields an economically large, wrong signed, and highly imprecise coefficient in 
the regression involving mid-year outlay changes.  The imprecision is driven in large part 
by the fact that there are very few observations involving positive deficit shocks in states 
with weak budget rules during this period.  These were also years when states were more 
likely to have surpluses left over from prior years, making it possible for them to balance 
their budgets with smaller mid-year spending reductions and tax increases.  The 
measurement of deficit shocks may also be more error prone during expansionary years 
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due to the absence of reporting on mid-year spending increases.
24
  For some combination 
of these reasons, we observe that the budget rules lack predictive power during the 
expansionary period.  Consequently, we focus solely on the periods of fiscal stress in our 
effort to estimate the effects of state budget cuts on state economies. 
The absence of predictive power during expansions need not pose a problem for 
efforts to estimate the effect of government spending “on impact” during recessions.  
However, it does raise problems for efforts to estimate multipliers in models with lag 
structures.  The absence of a clean, extended time series is not conducive to efforts to 
account for complex dynamics. 
6. Budget Rules as a Source of Variation for Estimating Fiscal Policy Multipliers  
We now explore the prospects for using equation (4) as the first stage in an 
instrumental variables strategy for estimating the effects of budget cuts on economic 
outcomes.  The estimating framework is summarized below: 
sttststssts trendDefshockDefshockweakBBRG  *
ˆ
,2,1,   
tssttstststs trendDefshockGY ,,2,1, *
ˆ   , 
where Gs,t represents the mid-year outlay changes from section 5 and where, again as in 
section 5, the specifications are estimated with distinct variables for the positive and 
negative values of the deficit shocks.  Before presenting the estimates we devote the next 
                                                        
24
 As discussed in an earlier footnote, the absence of reporting on mid-year spending increases may reflect 
the fact that, institutionally, increases in appropriations require legislation and are hence unlikely to be 
occur outside of the normal budgetary process. 
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sub-section to describing the economic intuition behind the key identifying assumption.  
We also discuss the principal threat to that assumption in detail. 
Identification 
The key identifying assumption, often called the exclusion or orthogonality 
restriction, can be written as follows: 
0. = )*Defshock*E(weakBBR ts,ts,s   
In short, the excluded instrument, tss DefshockweakBBR , , must be uncorrelated with the 
second stage error term.  
Noting that weakBBRs is binary, we can re-write this condition in two pieces: 
0, = 1)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR*
0)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR*)-(1
sts,ts,s
sts,ts,sweakBBR




weakBBRp
p
 
where pweakBBR is the probability that a state has weak budget rules.  The first piece of this 
expression automatically equals 0 since it is the piece for which weakBBRs always equals 
0.  Hence we are left with  
0 = 1)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR* sts,ts,sweakBBR p  
as the exclusion restriction, with weakBBRs always equal to one.  Since we include the 
main effect of the deficit shock in our regressions, it follows from the properties of 
ordinary least squares that .0)*E(Defshock ts,ts,   Consequently, we can write that if 
1),weakBBR|*E(Defshock)*E(Defshock sts,ts,ts,ts,    then 
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0.  1)weakBBR|*E(Defshock sts,ts,    In words, the restriction is satisfied if the 
unconditional expectation of the deficit shock times the second stage error equals that 
same expectation conditional on a state having weak budget rules.  We interpret this as 
requiring that the deficit shock variables have similar economic content in weak- and 
strong-rule states.   
The primary threat to this condition stems from differences in the revenue bases 
utilized across states.  Revenue bases with different elasticities (with respect to economic 
conditions) can lead a given economic shock to result in deficit shocks that differ across 
states.  As reported in Table 1, taxation accounts for 55 percent of general revenues in 
weak-rule states and 51 percent in strict-rule states, with personal income tax revenue 
accounting for the entire difference.  Strong-rule states make up this difference through a 
combination of charges, fees, intergovernmental transfers, and other miscellaneous 
revenues.  This raises concern because personal income taxes tend to be more volatile 
than other revenue sources.  Consequently, an economic shock of a given size may, all 
else equal, result in a relatively large deficit shock in the weak-rule states.  If true, this 
would upwardly bias our multiplier estimates.  Conditional on their deficit shocks, weak-
rule states would have better performing economies than strong-rule states for reasons 
unrelated to their budget cuts.   
We explore two ways of investigating and attempting to account for bias that may 
result from this difference in revenue bases.  First, we directly allow the relationship 
between deficit shocks and income to vary with the share of revenues raised through 
taxation.  We do this by controlling for an interaction between the tax share and the main 
effects of the deficit shock variables.  Second, we explore the precise timing with which 
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our initial estimates of the effect of mid-year outlay changes on income arrive.  If the 
avoidance of mid-year budget cuts is truly improving a state’s economic performance, the 
improvement should arrive during the latter half of the fiscal year.  It is only during this 
latter portion of the year that the fiscal policies of states with different balanced budget 
requirements would diverge.
25
   
The evidence presented below suggests that weak-rule states have better 
economic performance than strong-rule states in the first quarter of the fiscal years in 
which shocks occur.  This is consistent with the concern that there is, in fact, a difference 
between the economic content of deficit shocks in the two types of states.  We attempt to 
account for this by controlling directly for the performance of the economy during the 
first quarter of the fiscal year.  The inclusion of this control substantially reduces the size 
of the estimated multipliers.  Unfortunately, a lack of precision makes it difficult to 
convincingly distill a “best estimate” of the multiplier from this collection of 
specifications.  Low precision and instability across specifications lead us to conclude 
that this particular strategy for using fiscal institutions to estimate fiscal policy multipliers 
is unsatisfactory. 
Results 
                                                        
25
 In some settings the anticipation of a change in fiscal policy may lead a response to occur before the 
fiscal policy actually arrives.  Such anticipation effects do not seem particularly plausible in this instance 
for two reasons.  First, to the extent that these deficit shocks are genuinely unexpected, the anticipation 
effect would have to occur remarkably quickly between early-year recognition of the shock and mid-year 
implementation of the budget cuts.  Second, the limited available evidence suggests that the fiscal policies 
of weak- and strong-rule states do not differ for long.  Weak-rule states appear to pay down their 
unexpected deficits within as few as two years.  Anticipation of the avoidance of budget cuts during the 
year of the shock would thus have to be coupled with a failure to anticipate the deficit-reducing budget cuts 
of the following years.  In our setting, plausible explanations of the multiplier must rely primarily on the 
potential contemporaneous effects of government spending (which could include shifts in consumption due 
to the relaxation of liquidity constraints and various channels through which government spending might 
crowd in or crowd out contemporary private activity). 
 24 
 Table 5 presents the most basic set of second stage results.  We present results 
separately for the 1988-1994 (columns 1 and 2) and the 2001-2004 (columns 3 and 4) 
periods of fiscal stress.  For each period we show results both with (columns 1 and 3) and 
without (columns 2 and 4) the inclusion of state-specific trends.  In both periods, the 
results with state-specific trends imply relatively large multipliers while the results 
without trends imply multipliers much closer to, or even below, one.  None of the results 
are very precisely estimated.     
In results not reported, we found that the coefficients in Table 5 are robust to 
changes in the specification of the instruments (e.g., to only using the interaction between 
positive deficit shocks as an instrument or to dividing the budget rules into the weak, 
medium, and strong classification), to the use of Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood estimation rather than Two Stage Least Squares estimation, and to an 
expansion of the sample that incorporates states with biennial budget cycles and annual 
legislative cycles.  We also obtain similar results (with the benefit of less sensitivity to 
the exclusion of fixed effects and trends) when we run each state’s personal income series 
through the Hodrick-Prescott filter prior to estimation.  In the reported results we focus 
on dimensions of the robustness analysis that highlight problems with the estimation 
strategy.     
 Table 6 presents results from specifications in which we include controls for 
interactions between the share of a state’s general revenues that come from taxation and 
the measures of deficit shocks.  This specification allows the relationship between deficit 
shocks and income to vary with the tax share, which would be expected given that taxes 
exhibit greater volatility than other sources of revenue.  The inclusion of these controls 
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decreases the size of the multiplier estimated for the 1988-1994 period while increasing 
the size of the multiplier estimated for the 2001-2004 period.  The interactions 
themselves yield coefficients that are imprecisely estimated and that change substantially 
across the two samples.  
 Table 7 presents an investigation of the timing of the income gains that were 
estimated in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5.  If these income gains are truly caused by the 
avoidance of mid-year budget cuts, then they would be expected to appear during the 
latter two quarters of the fiscal year.  The results in Table 7 show that this is not the case.  
The income gains appear to be equally spread across the fiscal year for the 1988 to 1994 
sample.  For the 2001 to 2004 sample the income gains actually appear to occur primarily 
during the first two quarters of the fiscal year.  While the results are not estimated, they 
raise serious questions about the validity of interpreting any of the estimated effects of 
mid-year outlay changes on income as unbiased estimates of fiscal policy multipliers. 
 Table 8 completes the investigation by re-estimating the specifications reported in 
Table 5, but with the inclusion of state income during the first quarter of the fiscal year as 
a control.  This is intended as a way to control for differences in the performance of state 
economies prior to the portion of the fiscal year during which balanced budget 
requirements would induce a divergence in fiscal policy.  As expected, given the results 
from Table 7, the inclusion of this control tends to substantially reduce the size of the 
multiplier estimates.  The estimates presented in Table 8 would, if anything, be relatively 
consistent with the hypothesis that state government spending crowds out 
contemporaneous private activity. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have studied the behavior of state governments over the course of the 
business cycle.  A key feature of this behavior is the substantial pro-cyclicality of 
expenditures on capital infrastructure and service provision.  These expenditures tend to 
scale up and down proportionately with the size of the state’s economy.  When state 
income is one dollar below trend, these non safety net expenditures are, on average, 9 
cents below trend.   
The pace of state adjustment to fiscal shocks is driven in part by the stringency of 
their balanced budget requirements.  Unfortunately, our exploration of this source of 
variation in fiscal policy did not yield reliable estimates of fiscal policy multipliers.  The 
shocks were insufficiently large to generate a reasonable degree of precision.  We showed 
further that the second stage results are sensitive to several important specification 
checks.  Most notably, this included sensitivity to efforts to account for bias due to the 
relatively extensive reliance of states with weak budget rules on personal income 
taxation.   
Analysis of fiscal policy has produced a literature in which, even when an 
econometric strategy appears robust, results tend not to differentiate between theories of 
the business cycle (and by extension of stabilization policy) with significant statistical 
power.  A neutral prior for analyses of the spending multiplier is one. A multiplier of one 
implies neither Keynesian crowding in nor Ricardian crowding out of private sector 
activity.  The null of one (or, for that matter, other uncontroversial priors) could rarely be 
rejected in the literature, raising questions regarding how much we have learned 
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empirically about the absolute size of fiscal policy multipliers.  Advances in this literature 
have tended to be methodological and qualitative (or conceptual) in nature.   
We show that variation in sub-national fiscal policy will not, in general, yield 
estimates that directly support predictions of the effects of stabilization policy.  When 
variation stems from changes to the distribution of federally financed expenditures, the 
financing burden is shared by treatment and control states alike.  Consequently, any 
adverse effects of deficit financing (including reductions in consumption due to wealth 
effects and reductions in investment due to expected increases in interest rates) will net 
out to zero within the estimation framework.  These sources of variation provide direct 
evidence on government’s ability to increase economic activity in one region relative to 
another.  They do not, however, demonstrate the effect of stabilization policy on activity 
aggregated across the fiscal union. 
Direct tests of the effects of stabilization policy require differences in the savings 
behavior of similarly situated governments.  Fiscal institutions such as balanced budget 
requirements, stabilization funds, and tax and expenditure limits are potentially attractive 
drivers of the needed differences in savings behavior.  The shortcomings of the strategy 
investigated here are unfortunate because it had the potential to yield estimates with 
desirable applications.  They would apply most directly to estimating the effect of deficit-
financed stabilization policy conducted at the state level.  This would, in turn, provide a 
platform for extrapolating towards estimates of the effects of such policies at the national 
level.
26
    They could also be used to estimate the impact of pro-cyclical state 
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 The recent fiscal policy literature, and work going back to Gramlich (1987), have dwelt extensively on 
potential differences between multipliers at the national and sub-national levels, highlighting issues 
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expenditures on the volatility of the business cycle, with potential for estimating this 
cyclicality’s welfare costs.27  The relationship between fiscal institutions and stabilization 
policy should thus remain an active area of research.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
associated with “consumption leakages” and the implications of labor mobility across state borders.  
Consumption leakages would tend to reduce sub-national multipliers relative to national multipliers while 
factor movements could have the opposite effect. 
27
 Estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles vary widely within the literature.  Seminal work by 
Lucas (1987) arrived at a very small estimates of these costs, while more recent work (e.g., Krusell et al, 
2009, and  Chauvin, Laibson, and Mollerstrom 2009), has arrived at estimates equal to or in excess of 1 
percent of all future consumption.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine precisely how state 
government spending feeds into the mechanisms associated with some of the welfare costs highlighted in 
this literature (e.g., the asset bubbles studied by Chauvin, Laibson, and Mollerstrom).   
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Note: Figure 1 plots the unweighted means (across states) of de-trended personal income and state 
government spending outside of insurance trusts and safety-net programs on a per capita basis.  Detrending 
was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials.  Personal income data come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and state government spending data come from the Census of Governments 
(COG). 
 
 
Figure 2 plots state-year observations of de-trended personal income and state government spending 
outside of insurance trusts and safety-net programs on a per capita basis.  The best-fit line has a slope of 
0.089 (standard error of 0.014) and the regression yields an r-squared of 0.22.  Detrending was conducted 
using state-specific quartic polynomials.  Personal income data come from the BEA and state government 
spending data come from the COG. 
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Note: Figure 3 graphs deficit shocks per capita  and de-trended personal income per capita.  The deficit 
shocks were constructed using data from semi-annual reports by the National Association of State Budget 
Officers (NASBO).  Personal income data come from the BEA.   
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Strict vs. Weak Budget Rules States (1988-2004) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Strict 
 
Weak 
Fiscal Variables ($ per capita) 
       State General Fund Expenditures 1612 498 
 
1926 650 
  State General Fund Revenues 1620 503 
 
1925 657 
  Total Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev.  0.51 0.05 
 
0.55 0.06 
  Pers. Inc. Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev.  0.19 0.07 
 
0.24 0.05 
  DEFSHOCK -5 89 
 
13 98 
  ∆REVENUE 9 51 
 
8 70 
  ∆OUTLAYS -14 31 
 
-13 30 
      Economic Variables 
       Personal Income ($ per capita)** 26699 4414 
 
32342 5139 
  Employment per capita 0.43 0.04 
 
0.43 0.03 
      Demographic Variables 
       State Population 3264722 2070425 
 
12100000 8974343 
  Drop Out Fraction 0.18 0.04 
 
0.17 0.03 
  High School Grad Fraction 0.27 0.03 
 
0.27 0.04 
  Some College Fraction 0.18 0.04 
 
0.17 0.03 
  College Plus Fraction 0.15 0.03 
 
0.17 0.04 
  Medicaid Fraction 0.10 0.04 
 
0.11 0.03 
  Senior Fraction 0.12 0.02 
 
0.12 0.02 
  Child Fraction 0.28 0.03 
 
0.27 0.02 
      Observations 317 
 
131 
Note: ** and * indicate statistically significant differences between the means for weak- and strong-budget rule 
states at the .01 and .05 levels respectively.  The combined sample includes data on the 27 annually budgeting states 
listed in Table 2 for the period 1988-2004.  Several additional observations are unavailable due to incomplete data 
reporting, leaving a final sample of 448 observations.  Columns 1 and 2 report data for the states identified in Table 
2 as having “Strong” budget rules while columns 3 and 4 report data for states identified in Table 2 as having 
“Weak” or “Medium” budget rules.  Fiscal variables were generated using data from the Census of Government’s 
(COG) Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances  and the National Association of State Budget 
Officer’s (NASBO) semi-annual series Fiscal Surveys of the States.  Income data come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, employment data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and demographic data come from 
the March Demographic Supplements to the Current Population Survey. 
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Table 2 
Rules Classification: Weak/Medium/Strong  
   Weak Rules Medium Rules Strong Rules 
CONNECTICUT CALIFORNIA ALABAMA 
ILLINOIS MARYLAND ARIZONA 
LOUISIANA MICHIGAN COLORADO 
NEW YORK PENNSYLVANIA DELAWARE 
  
GEORGIA 
  
IDAHO 
  
IOWA 
  
KANSAS 
  
MISSISSIPPI 
  
MISSOURI 
  
NEW JERSEY 
  
NEW MEXICO 
  
OKLAHOMA 
  
RHODE ISLAND 
  
SOUTH CAROLINA 
  
SOUTH DAKOTA 
  
TENNESSEE 
  
UTAH 
    WEST VIRGINIA 
Note: The table contains a classification of the 27 states with annual budget 
cycles that are included in our final sample.  States were ranked according to a 
stringency index found in Table 3 of ACIR (1987).  States with an index value 
less than 5 are classified as weak, an index equal to 5 or 6 as medium, and an 
index exceeding 6 as strong.  When we classify states as strong or weak, the 
states classified as medium are shifted into the weak classification. 
 
 
 37 
Table 3 
State Responses to Deficit Shocks: 1988-2004 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
∆Outlays ∆Revenues ∆Outlays ∆Revenues ∆Outlays ∆Revenues 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} -0.283** .075** -0.382** .080* -0.383** 0.080* 
 
(0.062) (0.023) (0.049) (0.031) (0.049) (0.032) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 0.003 0.023 0.027 0.0021 0.028 0.021 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 
 
0.256** -0.015 0.203** -0.010 
   
(0.061) (0.033) (0.045) (0.030) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 
 
-0.057 0.004 -0.043 0.012 
   
(0.034) (0.232) (0.042) (0.030) 
Medium Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 
   
0.291** -.016 
     
(0.078) (0.040) 
Medium Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 
   
-0.076 -0.010 
     
(0.034) (0.028) 
       State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 448 448 448 448 448 448 
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the .01 and  .05 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at 
the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  The sample is as described in the note to Table 1.  The classifications of budget rules are 
as described in the note to Table 2.  The measure of deficit shocks was constructed using data from NASBO as described in the text.  ∆Outlays and 
∆Revenues are mid-year changes to outlays and revenues.  ∆Outlays is reported directly by NASBO while ∆Revenues is constructed using NASBO’s 
reports of changes in tax law that were enacted by the states during each fiscal year.  All fiscal variables are expressed in terms of 2004 dollars per 
capital. 
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Table 4 
First Stage Regressions: Period by Period 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
∆Outlays ∆Revenues ∆Outlays ∆Revenues ∆Outlays ∆Revenues 
 
1988-1994 1995-2000 2001-2004 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} -0.447** 0.146* -0.068 -0.038 -0.404** 0.066 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.086) (0.045) (0.099) (0.060) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 0.074 -0.039 -0.023 0.019 0.167 0.112 
 
(0.051) (0.039) (0.022) (0.040) (0.128) (0.084) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 0.332** -0.075 -0.951 -0.119 0.434** -0.009 
 
(0.077) (0.071) (0.656) (0.138) (0.111) (0.075) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.046 0.046 0.072 0.175 -0.289 -0.071 
 
(0.051) (0.044) (0.075) (0.109) (0.154) (0.086) 
       State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182 182 160 160 106 106 
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the .01 and  .05 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the 
state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  The sample is as described in the note to Table 1.  Specifications are equivalent to those 
estimated in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, but with the samples restricted to the years listed in the current table’s column headings. 
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Table 5 
Initial Estimates of the Effects of Mid-Year Outlay Changes on State Income 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Sample 1988-1994 2001-2004 
     
∆OUTLAYS 2.33 0.46 1.60 1.20 
 
(1.83) (2.20) (0.88) (1.20) 
     DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 1.30 0.70 1.01 1.19 
 
(0.81) (0.70) (0.33) (0.40) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.24 1.77 0.25 0.59 
 
(0.49) (0.55) (0.37) (0.92) 
State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Trends Yes No Yes No 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182 182 106 106 
Note: This table contains results from the second stages of IV regressions of personal income on mid-year 
budget cuts.  The sample used in columns 1 and 2 is the same as the sample used in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.  The sample used in columns 3 and 4 is the same as the sample used in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
4.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath 
each point estimate.  The excluded instruments in all specifications are the interactions between an 
indicator for weak budget rules and the main effects of the two deficit shock variables. 
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Table 6 
Impact of Controlling for the Share of Each State's Revenues Generated by 
Taxation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Sample 1988-1994 2001-2004 
     
∆OUTLAYS 0.64 0.29 2.98 2.98 
 
(2.77) (3.87) (1.02) (1.87) 
     State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Trends Yes No Yes No 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182 182 106 106 
Note: This table contains results from the second stages of IV regressions of personal income on mid-year 
budget cuts.  The sample used in columns 1 and 2 is the same as the sample used in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.  The sample used in columns 3 and 4 is the same as the sample used in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
4.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath 
each point estimate.  The excluded instruments in all specifications are the interactions between an 
indicator for weak budget rules and the main effects of the two deficit shock variables.  The specifications 
also included controls for interactions between an estimate of the share of a state’s general revenues that 
come from taxation interacted with the main effects of the deficit shock variables.  The tax share was 
estimated using the average value of total tax revenues divided by total general revenues for each state 
across the full 1988 to 2004 sample period.  The second stage coefficients on these interactions were 
imprecisely estimated and instable across specifications. 
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Table 7 
Estimates on a Quarter-by-Quarter Basis 
 
Personal 
Income, 
Q1 
Personal 
Income, 
Q2 
Personal 
Income, 
Q3 
Personal 
Income, 
Q4 
Panel A 1988-1994 
∆OUTLAYS 2.47 2.30 2.10 2.44 
 
(2.26) (2.41) (1.43) (2.66) 
     Panel B 2001-2004 
∆OUTLAYS 2.90 3.44 -1.11 1.18 
 
(0.87) (1.97) (3.95) (3.46) 
     State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table contains results from the second stages of IV regressions of personal income on mid-
year budget cuts.  The specifications reported across Panel A are equivalent to the specification reported 
in column 1 of Table 5, but with the dependent variable representing personal income for a single 
quarter of the fiscal year (as labeled in the column headings).  Panel B was constructed similarly, but 
with the specifications being equivalent to those from Table 5’s column 3. 
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Table 8 
Impact of Controlling for Income in the First Quarter of Each State's Fiscal Year 
 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Personal 
Income 
Sample 1988-1994 2001-2004 
     
∆OUTLAYS 0.41 -0.47 1.83 -.44 
 
(0.53) (0.69) (1.62) (0.91) 
     State Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Trends Yes No Yes No 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182 182 106 106 
Note: This table contains results from the second stages of IV regressions of personal income on mid-year 
budget cuts.  The sample used in columns 1 and 2 is the same as the sample used in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.  The sample used in columns 3 and 4 is the same as the sample used in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
4.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath 
each point estimate.  The excluded instruments in all specifications are the interactions between an 
indicator for weak budget rules and the main effects of the two deficit shock variables.  The specifications 
also included a control for the level of personal income during the first quarter of each fiscal year. 
 
 
 
 
